The Future of Wetlands Mitigation Banking by Shabman, Leonard A. & Scodari, Paul F.
CHOICES
The magazine of food, farm, and resource issues
1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1) CHOICES 65
A publication of the
American Agricultural
Economics Association
1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1)
©1999–2005 CHOICES. All rights reserved. Articles may be reproduced or electronically distributed as long as attribution to Choices and the American
Agricultural Economics Association is maintained. Choices subscriptions are free and can be obtained through http://www.choicesmagazine.org.
The Future of Wetlands Mitigation 
Banking
Leonard Shabman and Paul Scodari
Introduction 
Concern over historic wetlands loss led to a national goal
of no net loss (NNL) of wetlands acres and their environ-
mental services. In support of the NNL goal, the US Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps), under authority granted by
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, reviews permits to
discharge fill material into wetlands. A permit review pro-
cess called sequencing requires a permit applicant (permit-
tee) to first demonstrate to a regulator that they have
applied all practical means to avoid and minimize the fill-
ing in of wetlands areas as part of a development project.
Then the NNL goal requires permittees to provide
replacement wetlands—ecologically successful restoration
of former or degraded wetlands or creation of new wet-
lands from uplands—to offset the adverse environmental
effects of the permitted wetlands filling (see Shabman,
Stephenson, & Shobe, 2002, for a discussion of offset pro-
grams in air and water pollution control programs).
When the replacement requirement was first estab-
lished, permittees were expected to provide replacement
wetlands (or wetlands “credits”) that were similar to the
types of wetlands filled (“in-kind”), and that were located
on or adjacent to the area of the fill (“on-site”). However,
over time, program evaluations consistently found that
inferior wetlands restoration and creation practices often
were employed by permittees who had little skill (or inter-
est) in wetlands restoration. Even when state-of-the-art
practices were applied, the on-site and in-kind require-
ment often prohibited long-term ecological success, espe-
cially for replacing lost habitat services (e.g., wetlands
hydrology was compromised by surrounding develop-
ment). Meanwhile, because limited agency resources for
monitoring and enforcement had to be scattered among
many small wetlands credit projects, the quality of the
credits was not assured; in fact, some required credit
projects were never undertaken. These problems moti-
vated interest in new approaches—generally called “wet-
lands mitigation banking”—for securing ecologically
viable credits. One approach to mitigation banking relies
on third parties (neither the regulator nor the permittee)
to produce wetlands credits that can be used as offsets.
Third-party wetlands mitigation banking often has been
cited as a successful application of market-like environ-
mental policy. After reviewing the experience with wet-
lands mitigation banking, we will conclude with a
comment on whether this regulatory innovation fits the
definition of market-like environmental policy.
Mitigation Banking in Brief
The single-user wetlands mitigation bank leaves the respon-
sibility for credit production with the permittee. Under
this mitigation option, a large land developer or a state
Department of Transportation that expected to receive
multiple future permits develops one large credit project in
advance of and located away from (“off-site”) their antici-
pated fills. The credits, once certified by the Corps, are
deposited into a “bank account” that is drawn upon as
future fills are permitted. The off-site location and large
size of these credit projects increases the chance of ecologi-
cal success and allows the Corps to better target its limited
monitoring and enforcement resources.
Cases where investment in a single-user wetlands bank
was not an option because of the small size of wetlands fills
(e.g., parts of an acre) or the infrequent nature for a user
led to the development of fee-based programs. In a fee-
based program, permittees pay a fee to a third party, certi-
fied by the Corps, who produces wetlands credits in one or
more off-site locations. Once the fee is paid, the third-
party provider accepts financial and legal responsibility for
the success of the credits. In an in-lieu fee (ILF) program,
wetlands credit production occurs when a new project is
initiated, while in a cash donation program the fees are66 CHOICES 1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1)
used to expand an ongoing wetlands
restoration project beyond its origi-
nal scope. In either case, credit pro-
duction does not begin until
adequate funds are collected. Because
fee-based providers are typically gov-
ernment agencies or nongovernmen-
tal conservation organizations that
have the mission of wetlands restora-
tion and creation, there is some con-
fidence in the quality of the credits
that will be produced. Nevertheless,
fee-based programs have been criti-
cized for inadequate credit produc-
tion practices and for setting fees that
either may not recover the costs of
producing credits, or that may be so
high that they discourage use of the
program. Also, there is a temporal
loss of wetlands acres and services
while sufficient fees are being accu-
mulated (see Scodari & Shabman,
2001, for a review of in-lieu fee pro-
grams).
Fee-based programs established a
precedent for transferring legal and
financial responsibility from permit-
tees to third-party credit providers in
return for cash payments. That pre-
cedent generated incentives for the
development of commercial wetlands
mitigation banks in which private
entrepreneurs make investments in
wetlands credit production and then
earn a return on those investments by
selling the resulting credits to permit-
tees. In developing federal guidance
for certification and use of commer-
cial wetlands banks, regulators faced
a tension between ensuring high-
quality credits and the financial via-
bility of commercial wetlands bank-
ers. The former could be guaranteed
by requiring wetlands credits to be
produced and certified before they
could be sold. However, it may take
five or more years before ecological
success can be fully judged, and a pri-
vate investor typically cannot wait
that long to begin accumulating
returns. Thus, commercial wetlands
banks were allowed to engage in lim-
ited “early” credit sales (i.e., before
the credits have been certified as fully
successful) in return for the posting
of financial assurances that would be
released when credit success was
assured. This compromise facilitated
the development and use of commer-
cial wetlands mitigation banks that
have produced high-quality credits
and reduced time lags for securing
offsets. 
Regulatory Conditions and 
Commercial Mitigation Banking 
Currently, commercial wetlands
banks provide only a relatively small
fraction, perhaps 10–20%, of all wet-
lands credits, and there are very few
areas where robust credit markets
have developed. This situation can be
traced to the rules governing when
wetlands permits are required and the
separate certification rules for com-
mercial wetlands banks that raise
costs of credit production and create
demand uncertainty.
First, consider investor costs. In
addition to investment costs, there
are considerable administrative costs
to becoming certified as a commer-
cial wetlands bank; the approval pro-
cess may stretch over several years.
These costs and time delays serve as
barriers to entry and must be added
to credit prices when a prospective
banker does successfully navigate the
certification process. These increased
costs restrict supply of salable credits
and at the same time reduce the
quantity of credits likely to be
demanded by permittees. (For a dis-
cussion of these and other regulatory
conditions on credit prices, see Shab-
man, Scodari, & Stephenson, 1998.)
A number of factors work
together to create significant credit
demand uncertainty. There is market
uncertainty about whether future
land development in an area will
intersect with wetlands and thus
require fill permits. But even when
permit demand can be predicted, the
credit requirements that will be
What is a wetland? An area that is regularly saturated by surface water or 
groundwater and is characterized by a prevalence of vegetation that is 
adapted for life in saturated soil conditions (e.g., swamps, bogs, fens, marshes, 
and estuaries). However, not all wetlands are subject to regulation under sec-
tion 404 (US EPA, "Terms of Environment," http://www.epa.gov/OCEPAterms. 
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placed on permittees—and the
resulting demand for credits—is
highly uncertain. In fact, regulatory
factors are the greatest source of wet-
lands credit demand uncertainty. Per-
haps most important, the sequencing
process continues to give regulatory
preference for on-site credits. Only
after regulators have determined that
on-site credit production is impracti-
cal or environmentally undesirable
can credits from a third-party credit
provider be used as wetlands credits.
Then, commercial wetlands banks
often must compete with ILF and
cash donation programs that do not
have equivalent regulatory approval
or upfront investment costs. For
example, ILF and cash donation pro-
grams are not typically required to
post financial assurances and do not
need to reflect the opportunity cost
of capital in credit fees, because they
accumulate funds before they under-
take credit production. The result is
that permittees will favor fee-based
credit options over commercial wet-
lands banks when those alternatives
are available. Finally, uncertainty
about the future of the regulatory
program contributes to credit
demand uncertainty. For more than
30 years, administrative and court
decisions have rearranged the basic
structure of the federal permit pro-
gram. These changes include matters
as basic as what constitutes wetlands,
what constitutes fill, and what types
of fills are significant enough to war-
rant sequencing review. These shift-
ing regulatory principles create
uncertainty about future permit
demand as well as the kinds of credits
that may be required or allowed as
offsets.
Nonetheless, some commercial
wetlands credit production has
occurred in many areas of the county
since the mid-1990s, indicating that
the private sector will provide up-
front capital for wetlands credit pro-
duction if there is an opportunity to
profit from such investments.
Explicit or tacit understandings with
prospective permittees and regula-
tors have offered reasonable assur-
ances that there would be a demand
for some of the credits produced, and
the allowance for early credit sales
(with financial assurances) has helped
to ensure a competitive return on
investments. It is in such situations
that commercial wetlands banks have
developed. But, as noted, the amount
of credits now supplied by commer-
cial wetlands banks is small relative to
other mitigation options, and there
are very few areas with multiple com-
mercial wetlands banks competing
for business. Moreover, commercial
wetlands banks must set credit prices
to recover not only the costs of credit
production but also the costs of gain-
ing bank certification and the risk
costs associated with future demand
uncertainty. As a result, the credit
prices charged by commercial wet-
lands banks may exceed what many
permittees are able to pay.
A New Form of Mitigation 
Banking 
The private sector has demonstrated
the capacity to provide quality-
assured wetlands credits, in advance
of fill impacts, for use as offsets. To
tap this potential of the private sector
and to assure that credit prices paid
by permittees reflect the full cost of
credit production, a new form of
mitigation banking is being discussed
and developed. Called a credit resale
program, the approach is now in the
early stages of application in the
North Carolina Ecosystem Enhance-
ment Program (NCEEP). For a fur-
ther description of the NCEEP, see
Shabman and Scodari (2004).
Three interrelated components
characterize a wetlands credit resale
program. First, funds to capitalize the
program are provided to a govern-
ment agency that has the mission of
securing wetlands credits for permit-
ted fills. Second, that agency uses
some of the funding for planning to
predict the near-term wetlands credit
needs of permittees by type and loca-
tion. Third, the mitigation agency is
given the authority to act as both a
purchaser and reseller of credits. In
that role, the agency uses a competi-
tive bidding (Request for Proposal or
RFP) process to build an inventory of
quality-certified credits from private
sector suppliers. The bidding process
can encourage vigorous competition
among wetlands credit providers on
both quality and price. The winning
bidders immediately begin credit
production and are paid by the
agency on a defined schedule tied to
credit development milestones, the
posting of financial assurances, and
the attainment of performance crite-
ria. The RFP stipulates credit certifi-
cation requirements, and the defined
payment schedule eliminates credit
demand uncertainty, for the winning
bidders. The agency then resells the
wetlands credits it has purchased to
future fill permittees at prices that
recover the full costs of securing the
credits. As the credit inventory is
depleted, new RFPs are issued. If
properly designed and administered,
this approach can secure the supply,
quality, and price advantages of a
competitive market for wetlands
credits (numerous credit sellers com-
peting for the business of permittees).
Experience to date with the
NCEEP wetlands credit resale pro-
gram suggests two design consider-
ations for helping such a program
work as envisioned. First, the RFP
application process can be costly,
although not as costly as the process68 CHOICES 1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1)
for getting certified as a commercial
wetlands bank. Over time, qualified
credit suppliers will need to be the
winning bidders on some number of
RFPs, or they will not be able to
remain in the credit provision busi-
ness. Thus, the credit resale program
will need to issue a significant num-
ber of RFPs and then spread the
work in some fashion among quali-
fied bidders. However, there will not
be enough permitted wetlands fills in
one place to assure this result.
Extending the program to providing
other forms of mitigation credits
(e.g., stream restoration, nutrient
reduction, etc.) required by different
pollution control programs could
add to the number of RFPs issued in
any year. Also, expanding the wet-
lands credit resale program concept
regionally and across the nation
could increase the likelihood that
multiple credit providers would be
able to prosper.
Second, wetlands offset require-
ments, and the resulting RFPs for
wetlands credits, should be defined in
terms of categories of wetlands ser-
vices (that include hydrology, water
quality, and habitat) rather than in
terms of the wetlands asset (i.e., wet-
lands area and aggregate services).
The water quality and hydrologic ser-
vices of wetlands are watershed-loca-
tion dependent, and if lost to a
permitted fill, often must be replaced
on or nearby the fill site. However,
the values of wetlands habitat services
to people and wildlife are less site-
dependent, and since wetlands habi-
tat services that are replaced on-site
can often be compromised by sur-
rounding development, these services
are better secured at off-site loca-
tions. In the current wetlands mitiga-
tion program, a continuing tension
over which services to favor has led to
the requirement that wetlands credits
be located in the same (usually small)
watershed area as the fill permits.
However, limiting the location of
credits to small watersheds has led to
thin markets in wetlands commercial
banking (often only one certified
bank in many areas). A similar prob-
lem would confront a credit resale
program in which the RFP process
was focused on a very limited geo-
graphic area, because this would con-
strain the possible sites in a watershed
where land is suited for a winning
A wetland restoration project at the Phalen Corridor Initiative in St. Paul, Min-
nesota, 1996-2001. (1996 and 1997 photographs by Phalen Corridor Initiative 
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wetlands project. As the availability
of suitable lands for credit produc-
tion becomes more limited, it is less
likely that competition for credit
contracts can be fostered. If offset
requirements were stated in terms of
wetlands services rather than for the
wetlands asset, then a credit resale
program could issue RFPs for wet-
lands habitat services at larger eco-
region scales. This would increase the
pool of land parcels that would be
suitable sites for credit production,
thus making for more robust compe-
tition for credit supply contracts.
If the wetlands credit resale
approach was used to secure offsets
for only the habitat services lost to
permitted fills, regulators would still
need to secure offsets for any lost
hydrologic and water quality services.
In determining any needed offsets for
site-dependent hydrologic and water
quality services, regulators would
appropriately consider whether non-
wetlands alternatives required by
other regulatory programs could pro-
vide the necessary offsets. Site design
changes (e.g., low-impact develop-
ment), stormwater ponds, pervious
pavement, riparian buffers, and a
host of other methods can be substi-
tutes for the water quality and hydro-
logic services of wetlands and can be
implemented on or near the sites of
permitted fills. A variety of local and
state regulatory programs currently
require actions to mitigate for the
hydrologic and water-quality effects
of land development. Recognition of
nonwetlands programs would require
wetlands regulators to coordinate
with the relevant nonwetlands pro-
grams. The responsibility for assuring
this coordination could fall to the
mitigation agency charged as the
credit reseller. (See Scodari & Shab-
man, 2001, for further discussion of
the logic of this approach.)
Discussion
Commercial wetlands mitigation
banking and ILF programs are often
cited as examples of market-like
environmental policy. The reasons
for this perception are understand-
able. A discharger releases a pollutant
(fill) into the environment (wetlands)
and in turn must pay a price (credit
fee) to make that discharge. This
appears to be an application of the
market-like concept of an effluent
discharge fee. Or the permittee must
bear the cost of securing an offsetting
credit (a manufactured wetland)
from another entity, so the NNL goal
is met if they make a discharge. This
appears to be an application of mar-
ket-like concepts of cap and trade.
However, the reality does not
match the perception. Wetlands mit-
igation requirements and mitigation
credit options are not examples of
market-like programs. The polluters
(permittees) do pay when they make
a discharge, but the discharger does
not have discretion on when it is in
their interest to avoid the wetlands
and when it is in their interest to pay
the fee (bear the cost of an offset) and
make the discharge. Regulators
require permit applicants to do
everything the regulator deems prac-
tical to avoid wetlands impacts, and
regulators determine what kind of
offsets will be required and where
they can be located. I n this regar d,
the wetlands offset program is like
any other offset program. Regulatory
reviews drive the permittee towards
zero discharge, and then require off-
sets for the discharges that remain.
Wetlands offset requirements are thus
best understood as a permit condi-
tion tied to a traditional command
and control regulatory program.
As with other offset programs,
regulators need to have offsets avail-
able in a timely fashion and in suffi-
cient quality and quantity to meet
the environmental goal—in this case,
NNL of wetlands. It was in seeking
to meet these needs that the wetlands
mitigation program has experi-
mented with different forms of wet-
lands mitigation banking—some of
which have been understood as draw-
ing on the logic of markets. Certainly
encouraging private investors to
compete for the right to sell wetlands
credits is an application of a market-
like idea. In the case of commercial
wetlands banking, there is a percep-
tion that credit prices are being set by
a competitive buying and selling.
They are not. And it might seem log-
ical that ILF rates are tied to a market
price from a competitive credit sales
program. They are not.
The wetlands credit resale pro-
gram is an emerging idea that can use
competitive bidding to meet the par-
ticular challenge of securing offsets
for the wetlands regulatory program.
However, unless permittees make the
choice about when it is best to avoid
making the discharge and when it is
best to make the discharge and buy
wetlands credits, the wetlands regula-
tory program should not be viewed as
an application of market-like envi-
ronmental policy. This observation is
not offered as a recommendation to
change the current practice of wet-
lands permitting. It is only offered to
make the point that applications of
market-like environmental policy are
rare; at times, what appears to be a
market-like policy may not be that at
all. That said, as the wetlands credit
resale idea suggests, the benefits of
competition—certainly an idea
derived from the logic for markets—
still has much to contribute to the
design of wetlands mitigation pro-
grams.70 CHOICES 1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1)
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